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"Circuit Breakers" and
the Mission of Stock
Market Stability
J. Scott Colesanti, LL.M.*

I.

Introduction

periods of misfortune, stock market indices are targeted as unwieldy accelerants
of decline. The scant attention given to
such blame by experts and regulators in
recent times has been expended in reluctantly fine tuning inorganic creations
known as circuit breakers, obstacles to
further decline tantamount to shutting
off the lights and praying for the weekend.
This article examines the reason for
(and efficaciousness of) such artificial obstacles to "panic selling." Part II recaps
some of the most storied tales of near
market collapses on the Anglo-Saxon/
American timeline. Part III examines
the efficacy of the circuit breaker, a distinctly American solution that essentially
throws sands in the gears of an operation
which normally values speed and efficiency. And Part IV offers lines of in-

"Few of us can stand stock volatility.
Another man's, I mean." So might have
written the great Mark Twain' had he focused his famed observation of prosperity
on the reasons for stock exchange participation. For from the Middle Ages
through the present, the stock market investor has tolerated (if not actively
sought) a sudden, apoplectic rise in his
own portfolio. For the same time period,
investors have decried volatility not personally beneficial.
Volatility remaining both unavoidable and desirable, the likely follow-up
question asks, to what extent is it tolerable? While markets rise, little care is
given to the sustainability of prices and
strength of underlying corporate fundamentals. But during prolonged or drastic

* Assistant Professor Hofstra University School of Law
1. The actual quote attributed to the popular satirist was "Few of us can stand prosperity. Another
man's I mean." MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 166
(Digireads.com Publishing 2008) (1897).
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tury later, the British South Sea Bubble
of 1720, as a noted economist highlighted,
centered on stock foisted upon the public
but nonetheless owned in part by "Half of
the House of Lords and more than Half of
the House of CommonsFalse"4
Jumping ahead to America in the
20th century, The Great Depression can
surely be seen as an equal opportunity
catastrophe, effecting bankers and depositors alike. As the period's chief chronicler explained, there existed across the
sociological divide a perverted American
spirit, and a people "displaying an inordinate desire to get rich quickly with a minimum of physical effort;"5 the perversion
afflicted not only the Astors and the
Rockefellers (who clung to the resilience
of "Blue Chip stocks") but also the market
newcomer of the 1920s (who found himself able to buy $100 worth of stock with

quiry that might lead to a better version
of the artificial brakes - at least insofar
as retail investors are concerned.

II. A Classwide History of
'IrrationalExuberance'
In December 1996, then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan interrupted a jovial period of market
expansion to publicly comment that stock
prices seemed to reflect an "irrational exuberance" among investors. 2 But,
frankly, quixotic stock pricing has been
with us for centuries, and consistently
succumbed to by expert and layman
alike.

First, A Little History
Holland's "Tulip Bulb Craze" of the
1630s - in which speculators attempted
to gauge desire for transplanted European flowers of both healthy and viral varieties - was said to have been so frantic
and egalitarian as to ensnare "[n]obles,
citizens, farmers, mechanics, seamen,
footmen, maid-servants, even chimney
sweeps and old clotheswomen."> A cen2.

$5 down6).
The "dot coms" of the last decade followed a rush to market of technology
companies attending pioneering advances that permitted ordinary house-

The full quote reads in relevant part:

But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then
become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?. . We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not
threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs and price stability.
Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996), http:/
www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/19961205.htm.
3. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1996)
(1973).
4. Id. at 40-41.
5. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH OF 1929 (Houghton Mifflin Company 1997) (1954).
6. See generally Paul Gusmorino III, Main Causes of the Great Depression (1996), available at http://
www.gusmorino.com/pag3/greatdepression/index.html.
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defy reason.10 The subsequent enormous
rescue investment launched by the federal government itself spawned critics
fearing the ultimate inefficaciousness of
the bailouts.Indeed, the signs of the present crisis
were hardly hidden - between 2006 and
2007, a famed consumer group, the nation's largest regulator of brokerage
houses, and an international banking giant all had publicly warned of the imminent decline of securities tied to the
American housing market.12 Ultimately,
the collective the failure to acquiesce to
reason added one more wrinkle to the
story of American market regulation: The
need to protect wolves from other wolves.
Despite the variations in degree and
triggers, all of these downturns thus
stand as testimony to the unyielding
prayer of the king and pawn alike for volatility. Indeed, the expansion of the investor base in recent years is likely to

holds to trade stocks7 (in hindsight, the
flurry was seen more as folly than progress, and its consequences more humBut the
bling than debilitating8).
resulting "bubble burst" of March 2000
showered both groups with the same
soap, and the resulting lesson was clear:
Indulge in new fantasies of quick gains at
the risk of unprecedented and Streetrapid declines.

The Present Persistent
Recession
The tale (and attendant numbers) of
the nation's most recent economic nadir
gets no less harrowing through repetition. In sum, our stock market listed
stocks of giants that had simply wagered
too much on exotic vehicles dependent
upon an over-inflated real estate market.9 Proprietary positions at financial
firms became so linked to "collateralized
debt obligations" and similar exotics as to

7. See Investopedia, Market Crashes: The Dotcom Crash, available at http://www.investopedia.comlfeatures/crashes/crashes8.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (noting 18 million computer users by 1995 and 457 IPOs
in 1999).
8. See Gary A. Munneke, Maybe Mom and Dad Were Right: Musings on the Economic Downturn, 81 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 10,12 (2009) ("[I[n the early '90s we lost a little spare cash on a tech penny stock that didn't pan out.").
9. See Devin Leonard, "How Lehman Brothers Got Its Real Estate Fix" N.Y. Times, May 3, 2009, at BU1
(detailing the fallen giant's being saddled with $25 billion in "toxic residential mortgages" by 2008).
10. See Jon Hilsenrath, Markets Police Themselves Poorly, But Regulation Has Its Flaws, WALL ST. J,
July 21, 2008, at A.2 (noting subprime losses at Citigroup and Merrill Lynch reaching $80 billion by mid-2008).
11. See, e.g., DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST, 265 (2009) ("More than eighteen months after the Great
Panic [of 20071 began, more than a year after Bear Stearns was rescued, more than six months after Lehman
collapsed and AIG became a ward of the state, more than a hundred days into the Obama presidency, it was
still not entirely clear that Ben Bernanke and his allies. . . had succeeded at preventing what Bernanke called
Depression.").
12. See Consumer Federation of America, Exotic or Toxic: An Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for Consumers and Lenders (2006) available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/ExoticToxicMortgage-Report05O6.pdf; FINRA, Regulatory Notice 07-43 (2007), available at http:l
www.finra.org/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/notice-to-members/p036816.pdf (noting that, in view of the
failure of two large funds at Bear Stearns, the regulator would be scrutinizing investments in mortgage-related vehicles); John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect, The New Yorker, March 31, 2008, at 10-11 (detailing the
February 2007 announcement that international banking giant HSBC was reserving $10 billion to cover "nonperforming American mortgages").
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III. The Birth of the American
Circuit Breaker

cloud (rather than streamline) the dangerous game of market pricing, as the
"endowment effect" causes each of us to
overvalue something once we own it.1
Focusing more specifically on the American investor in the new millenium, the
studies disclose a player "full of irrationalities and inconsistencies" who is at
once too bold, too timid, too self-confident
and too quick to trade.'4
Add to that undesirable list of qualities the parallel and notorious tales of
Caligulan greed among the more experienced investors,15 and we begin to appreciate the need for a stock market halt.
That such base, destructive characteristics of investors should persist is perhaps
less astonishing than the continued tolerance of those who organize and oversee
stock exchanges; the observation becomes
more mundane when students of such bazaars come to learn of a fee structure that
flourishes with both advances and declines (and shrinks only in the presence
of inactivityl6) and thus avoids a halt until reaching irreparable proportions.

Between the morning of October 19,
1987 and the closing bell of October 20,
1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
fell 25%. Shunning the drastic remedy of
closing the markets (akin to FDR's "bank
holiday" of March 1933), the regulatory
response ultimately took the form of 'circuit breakers,' crudely fashioned, limited
trading halts essentially serving the purpose of sand in the stock exchange gears.
The trigger point for these market
shutdowns were originally set at constant
numbers of 250 and 400 DJIA points'7
(loosely tied to the events of October 19,
1987). Those triggers remained constant
from their implementation in April 1989
until April 1998. At that time, the calibration of the decline prompting a trading halt was changed to a percentage of
the average closing values of the prior
quarter. In turn, that percentage calculation was not altered until December 31,
2008. Consequentially, between October

13. See James Surowiecki, Status Quo Anxiety, The New Yorker, August 31, 2009, at 29 (discussing the
American public's "skittishness" to overhauling the medical care system).
14. Annie Murphy Paul, The IrrationalInvestor, Psychology Today, January 1, 1999, available at http://
psychologytoday.com/print22730 (citing Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman).
15. See generally John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect, The New Yorker, March 31, 2008 at 10-11 (detailing
very well-compensated brokerage firm employees yearning salaries in the mega millions).
16. The SEC, per statute, collects fees from stock exchanges as determined by the amount of trading
volume they host. See Securities Exchange Act Section 31 - Transaction Fees/Recovery of cost of services
("The Commission shall, in accordance with this section, collect transaction fees and assessments that are
designed to recover the costs to the Government of the supervision and regulation of securities markets and
securities professionals, and costs related to such supervision and regulation, including enforcement activities,
policy and rulemaking activities, administration, legal services, and international regulatory activities.). 15
U.S.C. §78ee (West 2007). The stock exchanges charge a commission to each member based upon revenues
(calculated by shares executed) that is required by rule to be meticulously and timely tallied each month. See,
e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule Information Memo 96-12 (explaining that monthly form 600TC required
of all members must record floor brokerage revenue including "income received from non-member broker-dealers as well as public institutional and retail customers.").
17. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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rived at in 1928), the barometer remains
the most quoted market measure in the
world and has itself become a vehicle for
investment (through speculative op-

2007 and February 2009 - as an inflated
DJIA gradually declined over 40%18 - the
breakers were not triggered once, raising
questions concerning their purpose and
effect.'9 To understand this inexplicable
march toward ruin, we need first look at
the index itself, and then its encumbrances.

tions). 2 1
As an index, the price-weighted averaging remains a bit obtuse. The actual
number representing the "DJIA" is "calculated by adding the trading prices of
the [30] component stocks and using a divisor adjusted for stock dividends and
splits, cash equivalent distributions
equal to 10% or more of the closing prices
of an issue, and substitutions and merg-

The DJIA
A weighted tally that has measured
market fortunes for over 110 years, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average is comprised of 30 equity stocks. Approximately two thirds of this group are
manufacturers of industrial and/or consumer goods. While the index is calculated daily, its roster is altered at glacial
speed (General Motors and Citigroup,
two early casualties of the economic crisis, were finally removed in June of
200920). Originally centering on 11 railroad stocks (the number of 30 was ar-

ers."22
As a barometer of the country's economic fortune, the average is userfriendly, ubiquitous and unique. The
DJIA reacts with equal displeasure to
both battle and bankruptcy;23 it may or
may not applaud public disclosure of
halted corporate waste. 24 It is at once
benefactor from and victim of Internet

18. For historical DJIA closing prices, see http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=ADJI. Between October 1,
2007 (14,027) and February 27, 2009 (7,062), the DJIA fell 49.7%.
19. See, e.g., AnnaMaria Andriotis, When Circuit Breakers Get Triggered, Smart Money, Oct. 24, 2008,
available at http://www.smartmoney.comlinvesting/stocks/Decode-Setting-Off-Circuit-Breakers ("For a circuit
breaker to go into effect now, the DJIA would have to drop by 1,100 points or more.") Chedley A. Aouriri et al.,
Exchanges - Circuit Breakers, Curbs, and Other Trading Restrictions, Investment FAQ (2008) available at
http://invest-faq.com/cbc/exch-circuit-brkr.html ("The new game in town is how to outfox the circuit breakers
and buy or sell quickly before the 50-point move triggers the halting of the automated trading [by brokerdealers].").
20. See Dow Jones, Dow Jones to Change Composition of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, available at
http://www.djaverages.com/?view=press&page=releases (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
21. See generally Dow Jones, Dow Jones Industrial Average, available at http://www.djaverages.com/?
view=industrial&page=overview (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
22. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 679 (Downes and Goodman, eds., Barron's Educational Services Inc., 7th ed. 2006) (1985). (5th ed., 1998).
23. See, e.g., DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 2 (2009)(noting both sizeable declines after the attacks of
9/11/2001 and Lehman's bankruptcy).
24. Compare the regular stock climbs after news of layoffs at publicly-traded companies with the news of
the impending bankruptcy of Enron. See www.voxeu.org/files/image/bloom-figljpg (2009) (noting the staggering drop in Enron and other stocks in late 2001).
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a respite; de facto shutdowns at these entities are well known to regulators and
have inspired directives and rules aimed
at keeping phone lines and operations
open. 28
Concerning the aforementioned
Crash of October 19-20, 1987, the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.)
issued an autopsy report containing
mixed messages. Specialists - the wellheeled entities that match buyers with
sellers and operate as either to keep markets afloat - were said to have "in the aggregate, performed satisfactorily." 29 Yet,
the S.E.C. Report confessed that "a disturbing number of NYSE specialists on
October 19th either were not sellers or
did not take substantial positions."30 Eschewing soft targets such as a sudden
dearth of foreign investors or the role of
derivatives, the Report took aim at exchange operational structures and their
ability to handle the unprecedented selling volume.

trading.25 In sum, it always reacts, and,
in so doing, repeatedly proves its utility
as both originator and interpreter of bad
news.

The Brakes
Stated bluntly, the outright suspension of business at a stock exchange is
undesirable. Apart from the conventional wisdom that such periods of inactivity fuel fear and stockpile sell orders,
academics and others have put forth convincing arguments that such closures can
serve political (and not necessarily salutary) purposes.2
Ironically, it is the stock exchanges
who often wish to avoid a "bank holiday"
like the one implemented by FDR in
March 1933. In fact, during the Market
Crash of 1987, the successful attempts of
the NYSE Chairman to keep markets
open were seen as at once and bold and
rational.27 Conversely, registered brokerdealers, bearing the brunt of ever-increasing customer sell orders, clamor for

25. See "The effect of the Internet on stock market volume and volatility," REVIEW OF BUSINESS (Sept. 22,
2005), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/technology/602565-1.html.
26. See, e.g., Professor William L. Silber, Birth of the Federal Reserve: Crisis in the Womb (New York
University School of Business Working Paper No. FIN-03-27, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1299468 (arguing that the suspension of trading at the NYSE for four months following the outbreak of World War I enabled President Wilson to both launch the Federal Reserve and forestall an
outflow of gold).
27. CHARLES GASPARINO, KING OF THE CLUB: RICHARD GRASSO AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE 59-61 (Collins Business 2007) (detailing the Chairman's private and public efforts to keep
the NYSE open for business despite pressure from its constituents and onlookers).
28. See, e.g., S.E.C. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 8 (Sept. 8, 1998), available at www.sec.gov/rules/othern/
slbmr8.htm (stating the views of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation about the need for broker/dealers to
maintain enough internal systems capacity to operate properly when trading volume is high); See also NYSE
Rule 51, available at http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1-2&manual=/
nyse/nyse-rules/nyse-rules/ (requiring NYSE member firms to remain open "for the transaction of business on
every business day.").
29. SEC Staff Report, The October 1987 Market Break, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Special Report No. 1271, at xvii
(1988) (extra edition) ("the S.E.C. Report").
30. Id.
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time accommodated varieties of trading
including "List DOT" (i.e., orders containing lists of various securities to be bought
or sold) and Super DOT" (i.e., large) orders that equally allowed firms to enter
orders directly from firm trading desks
(thus bypassing the Floor "crowd"). Perhaps more importantly, the DOT system
had grown in such efficiency that, by
1986, 92% of all DOT orders were "executed and reported back to the originating firm within two minutes."32
Interestingly, it was this curious
"List" or "program trading"33 that
prompted the S.E.C. Report to note that,
on October 20, 1987, "the NYSE requested that its members not use the
DOT List processing feature for any program trades.""3
To be sure, the S.E.C. report clarified
the disaster and updated the public on
the workings of the exchanges. But the
remedies would need to be implemented
by those exchanges themselves. Faced
with an unprecedented decline, a broad
array of investors, and the more immedi-

Those structures were said to have
become overloaded in October 1987, as
the average daily NYSE trading volume
of 175 million shares more than tripled
and automated trading programs competed with retail order flow. Order imbalances - the extent to which sellers
outnumbered buyers - were attributed by
the S.E.C. mainly to institutional customers, both clarifying the mechanics or ordinary order-routing on an exchange and
dispelling the notion that the layman's
panic precipitated the Crash.31
The mechanics of the October overload can be summed up as follows: Orders
in a particular stock were routed manually or electronically to a Specialists
booth. Two-thirds of these orders were
entered via the DOT (Designated Order
Turnaround) system, a computerized order facilitator handling orders to buy or
sell up to (in most instances) 2,099
shares. Originally designed to both allow
Specialist access for small, retail orders
and to free up Floor traders for bigger,
block deals, the DOT system had over
31.

The S.E.C. Report reads as follows:

Overall, the predominant source of selling pressure throughout the [October 19, 1987 trading] day
was from institutional accounts, including portfolio insurance selling, mutual fund liquidations, margin liquidations, and selling by foreign accounts.. .The most significant factors during the afternoon
downturn appear to have been the convergence of stock selling from index arbitrage and portfolio
insurance strategies around 1:30-2:00, and continued selling from a broad range of sources including
portfolio insurance strategies thereafter. .
Id. at 2-19. Conversely, a broader, less specialized clientele is cited for the amazing DJIA recovery of 102 points
(5.88%) and record volume of 613.7 million shares on October 20th. Id. at 2-20.
32. Id. at 7-19 n. 61.
33. "Program Trading" is an automated hedging strategy defined by the NYSE as "a wide range of portfolio trading strategies involving the purchase or sale of 15 or more stocks having a total market value of $1
million or more." See www.nyse.com/glossary/Glossary.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). In recent years, it has
reached noteworthy proportions of overall trading at the NYSE; in June 2009, the practice accounted for,
during one week, over 48% of all volume on the exchange. See http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PT06.22-06.26.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
34. S.E.C. Staff Report, supra note 27, at 7-24.
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Level 2 below its closing value on the previous tradingday:
(i) before 1:00 p.m. Eastern time, for two
hours;
(ii) at or after 1:00 p.m. but before 2:00
p.m. Eastern time, for one hour;
(iii) at or after 2:00 p.m. Eastern time, for
the remainderof the day.
(c) If the Dow Jones Industrial Average
reaches Level 3 below its closing value on
the previous tradingday, tradingin stocks
shall halt on the Exchange and shall not
reopen for the remainder of the day.

ate concern of accommodating dramatically increased volume, the NYSE simply
codified the practice it had quietly implemented during its October 1987 crisis of
delaying orders and imploring its members to stop sending program trades.35 In
effect, a market that strove to impress
upon the public its speed and transparency would - in rare times of chaos -

stop work and leave stock prices clouded.

The key is the trigger points, which,
as described earlier herein, were adjusted
(belatedly) to a percentage scale in
1998.36 The original miscue in calibration
arguably relegated the device to disuse:
The only triggering of the Breaker between 1989 and 1998 was in 1997, when
trading was halted (twice) in response to
37
plummeting markets in the Far East.
The "Levels" are re-evaluated quarterly by the NYSE, and were adjusted in
the fall of 2008 to read as follows:
*Level 1 Halt (10% decline)
A 1,050 -point drop in the DJIA before 2
p.m. will halt trading for one hour; for 30
minutes if between 2 p.m. and 2:30 p.m.;
and have no effect if at 2:30 p.m. or later
unless there is a level 2 halt.
*Level 2 Halt (20% decline)
A 2,100-point drop in the DJIA before
1:00 p.m. will halt trading for two hours;
for one hour if between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00
p.m.; and for the remainder of the day if
at 2:00 p.m. or later.
*Level 3 Halt (30% decline)

NYSE Rule 80B
Implemented in 1988, the breaker is
codified at NYSE Rule 80B, which reads
as follows:
Rule 80B. Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility
(a) Trading in stocks shall halt on the Exchange and shall not reopen for the time
periods described in this paragraph(a) if
the Dow Jones Industrial Average s
reaches Level 1 below its closing value on
the previous tradingday:
(i) before 2:00 p.m. Eastern time, for one
hour;
(ii) at or after 2:00 p.m. but before 2:30
p.m. Eastern time, for 30 minutes.
If the Dow Jones Industrial Average
reaches Level 1 below its closing value on
the previous trading day at or after 2:30
p.m. Eastern time, tradingshall continue
on the Exchange until the close, unless the
Dow Jones Industrial Average reaches
Level 2 below its closing value on the previous tradingday, at which time trading
shall be halted for the remainder of the
day.
(b) Trading in stocks shall halt on the Exchange and shall not reopen for the time
periods described in this paragraph(b) if
the Dow Jones IndustrialAverage reaches

35. Gasparino, supra note 25, at 58-60 (describing the NYSE's suspension of Super DOT orders during
the October Crash).
36. See Exchanges - Circuit Breakers, Curbs, and Other Trading Restrictions, The Investment FAQ
(2008), available at http://invest-faq.com/cbc/exch-circuit-brkr.html.
37. See Andriotis, supra note 18 (describing a 300-point plunge followed by a 200 point plunge later in
the day).
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augment a decline and thus warrant a
"cooling off period." The circuit breaker
is simply not designed to curb the "irrational exuberance" of the masses popularized throughout the ages.
With that and other observations in
mind, the author suggests three overall
conclusions:
"Panic selling" as we know it (i.e.,
wild market swings evidencing unpredictability and volatility) are rarely the
result of the impulse desires of novice
market participants. In fact, "market
corrections" are largely effected and perpetuated by professionals. Further, the
retail player now controls less than half
of the market. As recently as June 2009 ,
million share "program trades" constituted nearly 50% % of the daily trading
volume of the NYSE, 4 1 thus raising the
threshold question of whether measures
aimed at a retail order flow will impact a
market governed by the professional
trader.

A 3,150-point drop will halt trading for
the remainder of the day regardless of
when the decline occurs.38
The Breakers, inextricably tied to the
DJIA for the prior quarter, are thus dependent upon the collective market movement of the most recent times; further,
the chance of them being triggered is
hampered by a robust Bull Market (as
the DJIA enjoyed between 2003 and
2007). As has been aptly noted, the
Breakers failed to "kick in" during a week
in October 2008 in which the DJIA lost
over 1,000 points or on any of the alarmingly volatile trading days starting in the
summer of 2008.39 The drastic declines
prompting their use, the infrequent adjustment of the trigger points, and the
one-day nature of that trigger analysis
have all lead to the tool's infrequent invocation, thus lending support to the argument that the Breaker's value lies
much more in a psychological barrier to
continued institutional selling than to a
halt to widespread market panic. 40

Circuit breakers are created and
maintained solely by entities with a
vested interest in the market remaining
open; viewed in this light, the stopgaps
are but figurative concessions to regulators fearful of an unarrestable decline.

Better Brakes
It seems clear that, as either an imaginary fence or a practical wall, the
breakers' greatest effect will be on the behavior of the institutions and the experts,
who, situated literally or figuratively on
the Exchange Floor, are most likely to

These two points are underscored by
the original and continuing rationale for
Circuit Breakers: As a response to an un-

38. NYSE Euronext Information Memo 09-56 (Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://www.nyse.com/RegulationFrameset.html?displayPage=http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PublnfoMemos.nsflAllPublishedlnfoMemos
NyseCom?openview&count=250&RestrictToCategory=currentyear.
39. See e.g., Bring Back the "Uptick" Rule, available at http://www.wellingtonfund.com/blog/2007/09/09/
bring-back-the-uptick-rule/ (detailing trading days in 2007 that outpaced 1987 for volatility, accessed on July
29, 2008).
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
41. See supra n. 33.
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the way up in addition to the way down;
concomitantly, the logical means should
require breakers to kick in when stocks
rise more than X % in any given trading
hour, session, or day.
REGULATION
For all the reasons discussed in this
paper, the S.E.C. needs to play a more active role in a field traditionally delegated
to the various exchanges. The White
House's Financial Regulatory Reform
plan of June 2009 perhaps dangerously
continues a trend of too much delegation
of market oversight to the market itself."
EDUCATION
The retail investor must appreciate
that these artificial halts were designed
to both restrain and protect the institutional players that were thought to have
come dangerously close to pitting the
market in 1987.45 Although touted by exchanges as surge protectors (an illusion
occasionally reinforced by the press), a
delay of 1 hour, 2 hours, or even a trading
day will rarely shield an investment in a
401k or college savings plan.

precedented spiral of decline in October
1987, and as an unseen wall to program
trading profits in more modern times.
Yet, as the politicians42 and pundits alike
clamor for the return of the retail investor to the stock market, little is being
done to examine how such investors benefit from a market that strives to avoid
periods of "extraordinary market volatility."
Concomitantly, the author suggests
the following measures as necessary necessities talking points as we endeavor to
unravel the market problems of 20072010 :
FREQUENCY
The Circuit Breakers need to be reset
more often and in more meaningful fashion.
PRECISION
The weeds need to be separated from
the oak trees. Should all trading stop on
frantic trading days, or should the exchanges make more use of their universal
abilities to halt trading in a particular
stock?43
UNIFORMITY
The logical theory posits that irrational exuberance should be limited on

42. See Brian Montopoli, Obama: It May Be Time to Buy Stocks, CBS News, available at http://www.
cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/03/03/Politics/Politicalhotsheet/entry4840788.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody
(Mar. 3, 2009).
43. Notably, in February 2010, the S.E.C. adopted circuit breakers for individual stocks imperiled by
short selling. See Press Release, "SEC Approves Short Selling Restrictions (Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm (detailing the imposition of a breaker upon any exchange stock
dropping 10% in a trading day).
44. See generally DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM/A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (June 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.
gov/does/regs/FinalReport web.pdf.
45. See Exchanges - Circuit Breakers, Curbs and Other Trading Restrictions, supra note 34 ("The circuit
breakers cut off the automated program trading initiated by the big brokerage houses. . .This automated connection allows them to short-cut the individual investors who must go through the brokers and specialists of
the stock exchanges.").
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IV.

Conclusion

14,000 DJIA, painful questions need be
addressed. Why have the stock exchanges acted as steadfast spectators to a
disastrous downturn that the public has
been reminded of on a daily basis? As is
abundantly clear, we are in our darkest
hour since 1929.47 Why has the S.E.C.
relegated supervision of trading starts
and stops to the exchanges themselves,
the very participants who most immediately profit from trading volume? And
why does an active government extol
market indices when such crude numbers
belie a complicated and diverse bazaar of
economic activity? If current events do
not succeed in triggering these inquiries,
then perhaps exchanges and indices are
best forever left to the vested interests
that propel such measures and markets
forward, and market players best left to
continue rooting for their own little slice
of volatility.

As the great Twain also penned, "History shows that the moral sense enables
us to see morality and how to avoid it."46
Likewise, Circuit Breakers serve best to
remind us when volatility has become intolerable , but the measures do little in
practical terms to stymie insufferable declines. The optimal solution to our cascading markets would probably lie in
communication of truly material events,
faster appreciation of market forces and
trends, and linked markets (worldwide).
But in the interim, artificial brakes remain the best means of staving off a complete market meltdown. The trick thus
becomes making such brakes more flexible, more utilized, and more consistent
with the findings resulting from S.E.C.
scrutiny.
Moving forward, as our Congress and
others complete the autopsy on the

46. MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD (Digireads.com Publishing
2008) (1897).
47. See, e.g., Washington Lawyer, July/August 2009, 24 ("As the nation plods through the worst recession
since the Great Depression").
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